


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Honour Killings in the UK Communities: Adherence to Tradition and Resistance to Change

RECEP DOĞAN

Abstract

Although honor killing is widely associated with Muslim communities, it can also be observed in other religious and cultural communities in the UK and elsewhere. As the author shall demonstrate in this paper, whether Muslim or not in communities where honour killings tend to occur, certain sociological structures and characteristics of communities introduce obstacle to internalizing new cultural norms and cultural change. In these communities, there are superficial social changes rather than deeper cultural changes. These communities can change, but only if the change can be accommodated and internalized with their cultural norms. It is, therefore, these characteristics, rather than religious beliefs or doctrine, which have provided an environment conducive for the occurrence of honour killings. So far, no attempt has been made to give an overall picture or characteristics of these communities of the UK where honour killings tend to occur. With a specific emphasis on why honour killings still occur in the UK, this paper attempts to make a start by focusing on characteristics of three religious minority communities of the UK, namely Muslim, Hindu and Sikh whose names have become associated with honour killings.

Introduction

Though, honor killing is not a solely Muslim phenomenon, it can be observed that the concept has increasingly become associated with Muslim societies in general. There are factors arising from the different interpretations of certain Qura'nic verses that have made Muslim communities more vulnerable to such misinterpretation and misunderstanding. These factors have already been argued and established by this author in a paper previously published by this Journal.¹ There are also factors arising from certain sociological structures and characteristics of Muslim and non-Muslim communities that have provided an environment conducive for the occurrence of honour killings.

Due to certain characteristics of these communities which introduce obstacles to internalizing new cultural norms and cultural change, in communities where honour killings tend to occur, there are superficial social changes rather than deeper cultural changes. These communities can change, but only if the change can be accommodated and internalized with their cultural norms. It is these characteristics that create an environment conducive in Muslim and non-Muslim communities to the practice of honor killings.

Britain is now a multi-faith and multi-cultural society.² There are inevitable cross-cultural social interactions, communications and exchanges among people in this multi-cultural society. In spite of these inevitable cross-cultural social interactions, why do honour killings still occur in the UK? Why do these people have intensely held beliefs or completely different perceptions about the understanding of honour and

shame? Do religious differentiations, Islam or other religious beliefs, have any impact on the occurrence of these killings? Is it possible for these people to change or is there no hope of changing at all? These are the questions repeatedly asked whenever the newspapers reflect a new honour killing case.³ In order to respond to these questions properly, the social determinants and characteristics of the communities where honour killings tend to occur should be understood. Although there is substantial literature on the concept of honour⁴ and the subculture of violence⁵ little has been written on why honour killings still occur in the UK. So far, no attempt has been made to respond to this question by giving an overall picture of the communities of the UK where honour killings tend to occur. With a specific emphasis on why honour killings still occur in the UK, therefore, this paper attempts to make a start in supplying this missing focus. For the scope and length of this paper, however, the author will focus on characteristics of three religious minority communities of the UK, namely Muslim, Hindu and Sikh⁶ whose names have become associated with honour killings.

In this context, in the light of subcultural theorists' arguments, this paper discusses the concept of the "conflict of value system" or "normative conflict"⁷ and argues that, whether Muslim or not, certain characteristics of these communities create an environment where subcultural norms which regard killing as an expected, normal and appropriate way to behave in case of dishonourable conduct, survive and endure through generations and across faith traditions. In the final analysis, the paper claims that because of these characteristics, people in such communities fail to adopt different thoughts, perceptions or understandings about the concept of honour and shame and, therefore, honour killings tend to occur in these communities.

Socio-demographic Characteristics of the UK Population

Britain is now a multi-faith and multi-cultural society. One of the recent reports published by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) shows that there are at least 25 different groups of people living in the UK who were born outside the UK.⁸ The report also shows that the "foreign-born" population has steadily risen from 2.1 million (4.2% of the population) in 1951 to 4.9 million (8.3%) in 2001.⁹ This report, however, looks solely at immigrants defined as people living in the UK who were born outside the UK. It is therefore important to note that its analysis only looks at "immigrants themselves (that is people who moved to the UK). Second, third and subsequent generations (that is, people of immigrant descent who were born in the UK) are not considered",¹⁰ and they are outside the scope of the report.

The most up-to-date figure for the size of the UK's foreign-born population can be estimated using the Labour Force Survey. This reports that 10.1% of the total population in 2006 was foreign-born.¹¹ A rough interpretation of these statistics would suggest that 1 in 10 people living in the UK has a mainly or totally different cultural background from the rest of the people living in the same society, and in this society each community has its own *social determinants* shaping and affecting social interactions, or determining the form of social relationships. The main distinguishing characteristics of these determinants are that they precede each member of the community, that they are out of the personal sphere or influence of each individual and finally that their life is longer than the life of each individual.¹² It is these determinants that have a tremendous impact on human behaviour and help us to fully understand the motives behind human behaviour in social interactions.

By virtue of these social determinants, such as customs and mores, each member of the community comes into possession of definite patterns of behaviour. These determinants are a strong influence on the life of each individual and they play an important role in controlling their behaviour.¹³ In many honour killing cases, the defendants unconsciously mention the social determinants. The expressions used in the statements of the defendants such as “I had no choice”,¹⁴ “it was not in my hands” or “it is hard to fight a whole society when they all think that killing is the best method of dealing with such cases”¹⁵ perfectly reflect the main characteristics of these determinants. Although they are not happy at all with what they did, the defendants strongly believe that they acted in accordance with these determinants and they carried out the duty imposed on their shoulders. Therefore, the social determinants and characteristics of the communities where honour killings tend to occur should be understood.

Although it would be implausible to claim that all communities where honour killings tend to occur have the same characteristics, we can make some general claims, with the caveat that a community that has all the characteristics discussed below is not necessarily bound to practise honour killings and any community that practises honour killings is not bound to have all the characteristics. Though, the British Home Office statistics¹⁶ and other available data¹⁷ suggest that honour killing is not restricted to the Muslim communities, and it occurs in other religious and cultural communities in the UK and elsewhere such as, the Yazidi in Iraq, the Druze in Lebanon, and the Coptic Christians in Egypt,¹⁸ for the scope and length of this paper, however, the author will focus on characteristics of three religious minority communities of the UK, namely Muslim, Hindu and Sikh whose names have become associated with honour killing. Therefore, the characteristics that will be discussed here are in no way intended to interpret, encourage or support the assumption that honour killing is a solely “Muslim phenomenon”. Second, since a complete picture of these three minority group cannot be drawn, the characteristics reflected here should not be seen as the definitive picture of all characteristics that have provided an environment conducive for the occurrence of honour killings. It should be understood as a quest for an answer to the important question of why honour killings still occur in the UK. For the sake of clarity and consistency, the author wishes to emphasize again, unless otherwise specifically mentioned in this paper, whenever used the phrase “communities”, “community” or “communities where honour killing tend to occur” refer to Muslim Hindu and Sikh communities of the UK; and the term “characteristics” refer to the characteristics of these three communities. The author will analyse and identify these characteristics further below.

Honour Killings and Characteristics of UK Communities

Ascribed Positions and the Concept of Individuality

In the communities of the UK where honour killings tend to occur, there are adaptations to wider society so obvious that even a lay person who does not have any expertise in sociology or anthropology can see it. People have started to wear shirts, trousers and jackets rather than their traditional outer garments. They send their daughters and sons to school. The women and girls stop using their head scarves as they used to before, and they have started to take part in business activities as well. The whole community is constantly engaging in activities and showing behaviour patterns that are completely different from their ancestors. However, all of these changes are social, not cultural. As Sharma mentions:

[T]he term “social change” is used to describe variations of any aspect of social processes, social patterns, social interactions, or social organisation. It includes alterations in the structure and functions of society and can be observed in every society. Whenever one finds that a large number of persons engaged in activities that differ from those which immediate forefathers were engaged in sometime before, one finds a social change.¹⁹

In this context, culture gives speed and direction to social change and determines the limits beyond which social changes cannot occur. In other words, the field of social change is limited by the field of cultural change.²⁰ As far as the concept of honour killing is concerned, we encounter communities that have a tendency to change only as far as their culture permits. Therefore, when it comes to the concept of pre-marital and adulterous sex, marriage, family values or women’s sexuality, these communities can change, but only if the change can be accommodated and internalized with their cultural norms.

In such communities, the pattern of so-called *negative reference society* is generally used. In this context, British society, or other societies that have different cultural understanding of honour and shame, are referred to and regarded as negative societies, or simply “others”. People refer to these societies when they wish to praise their own community for not being like them, or wish to express how proud they are not to have same cultural norms.²¹ By using this negative reference, or, “us versus them” argument, they maintain cultural differences between themselves and others.

Therefore, in such communities, *ascribed positions* have a much more prestigious meaning than achieved positions have.²² No matter how successful you are in business or education, positions given by birth or ascription as being a daughter, son, wife, husband, mother or father always prevail and maintain their priority. Whenever there is a conflict between tasks or duties arising out of these two types of social positions, the member of the community must follow his ascribed position and act in accordance with it. Needless to say, ascribed positions are shaped in accordance with cultural norms. Hence, the question of what the member of the community has to do when he witnesses a dishonourable or shameful act will be determined in accordance with his ascribed position, not his achieved position. Therefore, education does not always have an affirmative impact on preventing honour killings, despite the fact that it has a great impact on improving human behaviour in other aspects of life.

As happens to an extent in all communities, there is a naturally evolving “community sentiment” which is very strong in the communities where honour killings tend to occur. No individual can live unaffected by this sentiment, although its intensity varies in different communities and in different members of the same community. Community sentiment evinces three constituents: We—feeling, role feeling and the sense of dependence.²³ As Sharma states:

The most important element in community sentiment is the “We feeling”. As a result of it an individual, instead of regarding himself as separate from others, believes himself to be identified with them ... The fundamental cause of this feeling is a similarity of interest of the people who live in the same place.²⁴

The role feeling means that in the community, each individual has his own status and he feels that he should make his own contribution towards the working of the community in accordance with this status. Finally, the sense of dependence means that an individual believes himself to be dependent upon his community and denies his existence apart

from community. Due to this feeling of dependence he does not object to any obligations which the community places upon him and he always tries to work in its favour.²⁵

As a result of community sentiment and these feelings, in some communities where honour killings tend to occur, the concept of individuality hardly exists. In sociological terms, a human being is truly an individual actor to the extent that he is not the hostage of his cultural norms. In other words, the concept of individuality is not dependent on how different a person looks, but on whether or not a person is free or unrestricted when he interacts with others.²⁶ As the members of such communities are unable to free themselves from their cultural norms determining the concept of honour and shame, they may not think individually and their personal opinions indeed may have no value at all. Thus, when conflict arises, or the member of the community struggles to find an answer to whether an act or behaviour is dishonourable, the collective conscience generally prevails over the individual conscience or initiative. In other words, "the individual exists only through the [community], the respect and the love of the [community]".²⁷ The community always has control over the actions of its members, and an individual cannot behave just as he happens to wish, since he has to bear in mind the consequences of his action upon other people. The community's control over its members is carried out by means of cultural norms including mores, customs, traditions and also taboos. Whenever these norms are neglected or defied, the community specifies necessary sanctions or punishments, in forms of criticism, condemnation and exclusion, against nonconforming behaviour.²⁸

Rumour, Gossip and Joint Family Structure as Control Mechanisms

Available data show that in many honour killing cases the chain of events that led to the killing started as a mere suspicion or a rumour that a female relative has defied the accepted cultural norms by being disobedient or behaving improperly.²⁹ In this context, gossip or rumour is an important instigating event in the murder. As Faqir mentioned:

Reputation and rumour play an active role instigating honour crimes and killings, for to speak of a women's reputation is to invoke her sexual behaviour. Therefore, language (or the discourse of female reputation in particular) acts as a material practice with its own determinate effects, acting as a form of control over their emotions and passions and steering girls into a subordinate relationship with men. The significance attached to sexual reputation is one method of policing women. Significantly women also police each other through the spreading of rumours.³⁰

The significance of rumour and gossip lies behind one of the characteristics of the community which is close and continuous relationships among its members. These close and continuous relationships emanate from the joint family structure which is commonly seen in the communities where honour killings take place. Although this type of family structure provides an environment conducive for developing community sentiment and the community's control over its members by bringing them into conformity to the approved pattern of behaviour, it also provides an environment that hinders the development of personality, and worsens women's status in the community.³¹

In the joint family, the head is the absolute ruler. He is usually the oldest member of the family who looks upon and treats men and women as children

even when they attain adulthood. In this way, there is very little opportunity for the fostering of individual autonomy or self-dependence ... The bad condition of women is also a major defect of the joint family system and is at the same an important factor in its disintegration.³²

In such an environment, it is very difficult to conceal any sexual affairs or improper behaviour. Expressions such as: “what will the neighbours or relatives say after hearing this?”; “how can I walk with my head held high among people?” are used to portray the importance attached to rumours and gossip as a means of social control. By means of the rumour mill and whispering campaign, a story about the immoral behaviour or sexual reputation of a female can easily be passed from one person to another and finally is known by the whole community. If the sexual reputation of a female is stained with rumours and gossip, in the eyes of the community she is not part of the community any more.³³ The relatives of the female who is rumoured against have to prove that the rumour is not true, in a way that is accepted by the community.

Proving that the rumour is not true is an important task, and the historical evidence shows that the accepted ways to rebut an allegation differ from society to society. For instance in Babylon, the code of Hammurabi (c. 1780 BCE) article 132 ordains that:

If the “finger is pointed” at a man’s wife about another man [*if a woman is accused of committing adultery*], but she is not caught sleeping with the other man, she shall jump into the river for her husband.³⁴

In this context, the holy river was regarded as an absolute arbiter for proving the rumour or allegation is not true. If the accused woman goes and leaps into the river and she is not drowned in the river, she proves her innocence. If she sinks, she is guilty and her punishment is actually given by the holy river.

In Islamic belief and *Shari’a* law, in order to prove *zina* (adultery or sex out of wedlock), the act of *zina* must be witnessed by four rational adults. The Qur’anic verse 24:4 to 9 (*Surah Nur*) ordains that:

Those that defame honourable women and cannot produce four witnesses shall be given eighty lashes. Do not accept their testimony ever after, for they are great transgressors—except those among them that afterwards repent and mend their ways. God is forgiving and merciful.

If a man accuses his wife but has no witnesses except himself, he shall swear four times by God that his charge is true, calling down upon himself the curse of God if he is lying. But if his wife swears four times by God that his charge is false and calls down His curse upon herself if it be true, she shall receive no punishment.³⁵

Therefore, there can be ways to prove that the rumour or allegation is not true. Relatives of the female who is rumoured to have had an affair or to have behaved improperly have to prove that the rumour is not true, in a way that is accepted by the community. Otherwise, the family and the community must save themselves from the immoral. If the family does not carry out their responsibility, they are alien to the community, too. The relationship between the family members and the community is broken and the community has absolutely no sympathy for them. In the eyes of the community, they become outsiders criticized for having a different cultural understanding of honour and shame.

In such circumstances, there is an explicit or implicit pressure from the community or extended family members who believe that killing is the best method to be applied to

restore family honour.³⁶ Many expressions, words and threats can be used to state that killing a woman is easy, and her death would be a good solution. In this context, it is believed that killing sets an example and teaches a lesson to others. Killing is a metaphor or in Sharma's words "auto-suggestion" designed and suggested as the best method of dealing with such cases.³⁷ If the member of the community has previously been subjected to a powerful behaviour pattern and mindset suggesting how to act in specific situations, conditions or circumstances, they will act or think in accordance with this pattern in such situations without judging the propriety or justifiability of the suggestion. They will take it to be a form of truth. In terms of shameful or dishonourable acts, killing is an *auto-suggestion* in the community. Where shameful or dishonourable acts of females are concerned, males are always engrossed in the way of thinking that they are not a man unless they restore their honour and that their manhood will be questioned until they restore their family honour by saving themselves from the immoral.

Given that, in the community, there is little opportunity for the fostering of individual autonomy or self-dependence, the male relatives of any females who defy cultural norms are very prone to explicit or implicit pressure from the community, or extended family members, that support this suggestion. From the beginning, the environment in which they have been brought up has provided the necessary conditions for the applicability of this suggestion. "People resist suggestion to a greater or lesser degree but if the suggestion carries much weight, then their resistance will inevitably crumble and they will accept it".³⁸ Moreover, if this suggestion is accepted and supported by a prestigious person, such as the oldest male member of the family, who ordains that killing is the best method to be applied for the dishonourable act, there is no way to oppose the suggestion and the absolute ruler.

Endogamy

Endogamy is also another characteristic of the communities where honour killings tend to occur.³⁹ As a form of marriage, endogamy requires each male to get married and to seek a bride within his own community. Therefore, maintaining female relatives suitable for the marriage is an important task for the family. The suitability of any female for marriage is dependent on whether

she has been 'used' by another man before coming into the hands of the husband, as the only legitimate 'owner' of a woman's sexuality. A non-virgin bride is regarded as 'second-hand' and some men avoid accepting them as their wife.⁴⁰

Given that virginity symbolizes purity, innocence and chastity of the female, it is regarded as a source of pride and honour for achieving the task of maintaining the females suitable for marriage. The loss of virginity is a taboo created by the community.⁴¹

Seen from this perspective, females have the potential to stain family honour until they get married, and, after their marriage, their husbands become mainly responsible for their honour. Therefore, fathers who successfully maintain their daughters as virgins and suitable for marriage are socially rewarded by their community's approval and praise because they proved that they had enough control over their daughters and they brought up them in accordance with their cultural norms. As endogamy necessitates each male to seek a female within his own community, the scope for the choice of the bride becomes very limited. This situation forces members of the community to find practical solutions to their problems that caused different endogamous marriage forms.

When considering the issue of marriage form in these communities and its impacts on the individual, Cahit Can (2002) and Claude Lévi-Strauss (1949) explain the logic behind parallel-cousin marriage, cross-cousin marriage and also arranged marriage.⁴² According to them, in any society communications and exchanges take place in three different forms: the exchange of females, the exchange of goods and services, and finally the exchange of statements or declarations.⁴³ All of these exchanges are carried in accordance with the principle of reciprocity.⁴⁴ The principle of reciprocity imposes mutual obligations on both sides. Therefore, when a male seeks a female in order to get married, he has to give one of his female relatives in exchange for that woman who will be his wife. However, as it is not always possible for both sides to find and make present a suitable woman at the time of the exchange, the problem is solved by promising to arrange a suitable woman in the near future, for the exchange of the available woman. This solution has created the arranged marriage, parallel-cousin marriage,⁴⁵ cross-cousin marriage⁴⁶ “babyhood betrothal”⁴⁷ or otherwise known as child marriage⁴⁸ as forms of marriage. Notably, the arranged marriage and cross-cousin marriage are common marriage forms in the communities which are the focus of this paper. Here, due to the length of this paper, the author is going to summarize only the main characteristics of these marriage forms.

As stated above, the arranged marriage and cross-cousin marriage are common marriage forms in Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus living in the UK. “Home Office Statistics show an influx of 15,000 prospective marriage partners (male and female) from the Indian sub-continent arriving in Britain in 2001 alone, the vast majority arranged by parents for their British-born children”.⁴⁹ Although the concept of arranged marriage differs from the concept of forced marriage, by requiring a process of negotiation and consultation between the parents and their children before finalizing the marriage act, many arranged marriages take place without seeking mutual, valid and informed consent of both bride and groom. It is reported that the Forced Marriage Unit, a joint unit launched by the Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 26 January 2005, dealt with 1735 cases reported in 2010 and gave practical advice to people at risk of being forced into marriage. According to information on countries of origin and geographical distribution, of these cases 52% were linked to Pakistan, 10.3% Bangladesh, 8.6% India, 5% Africa, 1.7% Turkey, 1.3% Iran, 1.2% Iraq and 1% Afghanistan.⁵⁰

In both arranged and cross-cousin marriage, “marriages are often the result of a family reaction to what may be seen as inappropriate behaviour on the part of the child or an attempt to preserve their cultural identity in the face of perceived alien culture”.⁵¹ In this context, marriage is viewed as a union between two families and not just two individuals who happened to have fallen in love. It is reported that in marriage practice of South Asian families including Muslim, Hindu and Sikh living in the UK, not only the compatibility of the boy and girl but also the families are taken into consideration. Therefore, there would be little chance of the marriage failing. Though Muslim families put the emphasis on getting married within their own religion, Hindus and Sikhs put the emphasis on getting married not only within their own religion but also within their own caste.⁵²

As these forms of marriage are built on the assumption that the parents know best for their children and “what worked for the parents will also work for their children”⁵³ they create an environment that not only legitimizes violence and oppression against women but also silences women from being able to discuss, seek support or oppose such an inter-familial agreement.⁵⁴ Any individual opposing this arrangement has to be brought into conformity with the interfamilial agreement by using every possible means. Otherwise,

breaching the agreement or not fulfilling a pledge brings the family's control over their daughter into question, in direct contradiction with the concept of manhood and the concept of honour. If other strategies or remedies to make her comply have failed, "the only remedy was for her male relatives to kill her in order to protect the family honour".⁵⁵ Given that available options are very limited for any woman put in the position to choose between obeying the interfamilial agreement and being killed, in communities where honour killings tend to occur women are more vulnerable to suicide and self-harm than their counterparts.⁵⁶ Women who do not commit suicide, but unwillingly agree with their parents' choice, develop a coping mechanism by simply accepting that such a marriage was "written in their fate or *kismet*"⁵⁷ which is not a good sign for their mental health.

In cross-cousin marriage, the marriage is performed between the children of siblings of opposite sex.⁵⁸ It is the main form of the endogamous marriage in which each male seeks a bride within his own community in order to save the community from others or from "outsider blood"⁵⁹ and maintain the family's property within the family. Using this type of marriage as the main form of marriage in the community also preserves the kinship among the generations by creating an environment, or ghetto, in which almost all residents are relatives of each other, and have close and continuous relationships with each other. It is this form of marriage that provides a natural habitat for an honour culture in which it is believed that "if a woman refused to comply with the rules set down by her [community], her 'immoral behaviour' contaminated the whole family".⁶⁰ Needless to say, in such an environment it is very difficult for any female to oppose such a marriage, because any opposition will be regarded as a dishonourable act and a defiance of cultural norms.

Finally babyhood betrothal or child marriage is another form of marriage that can be seen in these communities. A babyhood betrothal actually is a tradition among tribal families. In this tradition, "a baby girl becomes betrothed, normally by her father, to one of her relatives (usually her cousin) as soon as she is born".⁶¹ If a girl is betrothed to somebody, she must marry that person as soon she attains the age of marriage. This practice is designed by endogamous tribes in situations where the number of suitable women to marry is limited. However, this practice, which was designed for tribes that regarded females as property or a commodity to exchange, still takes place in the settled communities, and breaching babyhood betrothal is still regarded as a dishonourable act. Thus, Begikhani (2005) reports that the practices, *jin ba jine* (the exchange of two sisters between two families) and *gawre ba bichuki* (the giving of a woman in exchange for a child) still applied and sustained among the Iraqi Kurds, in following the rule of endogamy, tend to encourage honour killing. For example,

... in the case of exchanging sisters, when one of the sisters gets divorced, the other one has to leave her husband even if there are no significant problems in her family. In the case of giving a woman in exchange for a baby girl, if she later refuses to marry the man she is promised to, she will be in danger, the settlement will collapse and "honour violence" is likely to follow.⁶²

Limited Scope of Specialization

As explained above, because of powerful community sentiment, the behaviour of these communities' members shows a high degree of similarity. This similarity is also seen in the economic structure of the community where honour killings tend to occur. The

economic structure of the community is based upon similar professions, activities and engagements, in which most individuals perform the same or similar tasks. Given that the scope for specialization is limited, people engage in activities which are simple, and conducive to self-employed work such as taxi driver, owner of small take away, clothing or off-licence shop. Thus, the IPPR report shows that, for the period 2005/2006, the self-employment rate among the economically active working-age population born outside the UK but living in the UK was 35% for Turkish, 33% for Pakistani, 31% for Iranian, 21% for Bangladeshi, 11% for Indian and 9% for Sri Lankan workers.⁶³ In such an environment, the contribution of each individual to the community, his value and meaning for the community, are not regarded as different from the others. As individuals perform similar tasks, the existence or non-existence of any one individual makes little difference, and nobody is dependent on the performance of the others. Therefore, if it is believed that an individual has behaved immorally or improperly, the community can easily dissociate itself from that individual by labelling her as an alien or immoral that has no place in the community. Seen from this perspective, the concept of individuality is a phenomenon that can be excluded or thrown away easily.⁶⁴

Conflict of Value Systems and Subculture

In the communities of the UK which are the focus of this paper, there is a conflict of value systems or “normative conflict”,⁶⁵ between the dominant culture and a subculture, which means that different groups within society have very different norms about appropriate ways to behave in specific situations, and particularly in cases of dishonourable conduct. As explained earlier, the sociological structure and characteristics of these communities create an environment in which these subcultural norms survive and endure through generations. Despite the fact that there are cross-cultural social interactions, communications and exchanges among groups in a multi-cultural society, entrenched subcultures endure and preserve very different ideas about appropriate ways to behave in specific situations.

Subcultural theorists argue that, “human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them”⁶⁶ and the meaning of any social phenomenon is derived from, or arises out of, the interactions that one has with one’s fellows. The meaning of any act for an individual arises primarily from the meanings given to that act by other people with whom the individual primarily associates.⁶⁷ Apart from association, appropriate ways to behave in specific situations are learned through expectation and by watching what happens to other people.⁶⁸

In communities which are the focus of this paper, the concept of honour has a different and very powerful meaning, and in such communities people are surrounded by those for whom the loss of honour requires killing or violence in return. As a result of interaction over time with these people, the individual, as argued by Sutherland,⁶⁹ depending on the frequency, duration and intensity of his association with these views, comes to accept and to learn that killing, though itself criminal, is the correct response. Through associations in intimate personal groups, the drives and rationalizations which are necessary to behave in a certain way, are learned.⁷⁰ Over time, in the communities where honour killing tends to occur, individuals internalize the normative system and values of their community, and come to regard killing as an expected, normal and appropriate way to behave in case of dishonourable conduct. The normative principle that the right to claim honour requires killing or violence in return is reinforced and transmitted from generation to generation. These norms are reinforced by social rewards and punishment. People who do not wish

to follow the norms are criticized, ridiculed, condemned, and those who follow them are admired and respected. If these constraints and sanctions were not in place, the community, or subculture, would soon lose its separate identity.⁷¹ Like gang subcultures, where violation of law is appropriate and required in certain situations, these cultural norms continue to survive in subcultures and communities, not least in the UK. The process of subculturalization or internalization of the normative system of a particular subculture⁷² starts at very early age. Cohen argued that in the subculture of gangs the initial subculturalization occurs around the age of 14, and peak subculturalization occurs around the ages of 16 and 17.⁷³ As the internalization starts very early, the expectations of what the individual should do when he witnesses a dishonourable or shameful act are determined in accordance with cultural values shaped by subcultural norms rather than by legal norms of the dominant culture.

It seems that it is the power of the ideas themselves, rather than poverty or other particular social conditions that leads to personal violence. Here, there is a clear conflict of value systems between the subculture and the dominant culture.⁷⁴ Wolfgang and Ferracuti made similar observations. Like Sutherland,⁷⁵ Wolfgang and Ferracuti⁷⁶ found that the immediate causes of homicide are the values, norms and expectation of behaviour, rather than broader social conditions. Those ideas in the subculture may have arisen in the past for specific historical reasons, but they have been transmitted from generation to generation, even after those original social conditions had ameliorated or disappeared. This suggests that dealing with inequalities in social conditions may not help to prevent the subculture of violence. For so long as the norms endure, and, as long as the communities transmit the concept of honour, which inspires violence, from generation to generation, there will be a normative conflict, and honour killing will tend to occur, despite other cross-cultural social interactions, communications and exchanges among people in a multi-cultural society.⁷⁷

In the context of honour killing, the question should be asked whether the social conditions that generated those ideas in the past have really disappeared now, and why the honour culture that inspires violence grew up in the first place. If social conditions have been transformed, how do these values still find a way to be transmitted from generation to generation and remain intact? Little is known for sure how and why honour culture that inspires violence grew up in the first place. But, even though the social conditions that helped to frame those ideas in the past have totally disappeared, the ideas endure, with a new mentality or rationale, and are transmitted from generation to generation. For example, in the past, when a man sought a woman in order to get married, he had to give one of his female relatives in exchange for that woman who will be his wife. If it was not possible for both sides to find and make present a suitable woman at the time of the exchange, the problem was solved by promising to arrange a suitable woman in the near future, for the exchange of the available woman. As was explained above, this solution led to the practice of arranged marriage, parallel-cousin marriage,⁷⁸ cross-cousin marriage⁷⁹ and "babyhood betrothal"⁸⁰ as forms of marriage. Therefore, having a virgin female relative in the family and maintaining females suitable for exchange was a social necessity.

Now, when an individual seeks a female in order to get married, he does not need to give one of his female relatives in exchange for the woman who is going to be his wife. The social conditions that created these forms of marriage, and prompted honour killing in cases where there was no virgin relative, have disappeared, and having a virgin female relative for the exchange of females is not necessary any more. However, the practices of parallel-cousin marriage, cross-cousin marriage and babyhood betrothal

do still exist, and the importance of having virgin and obedient female relatives in the family remains intact. In the past, the need to have a virgin female relative in the family resulted from the requirement of mutual exchange. Now, however, such practices are carried out for different reasons, such as saving the community from others or from “outsider blood”⁸¹ and maintaining the family’s property within the family. Though it is not as essential as in the past, having a virgin female relative in the family, and maintaining females suitable for such marriages, continues to be an important task for the families in communities where honour killings tend to occur.⁸²

Although the conditions that gave rise to the importance of having and maintaining females suitable for exchange disappeared, the ideas remained intact but with a new rationale, and have been transmitted from generation to generation with their marriage practices. Certain characteristics of these communities, like endogamy, not only create the environment conducive for such conditions with a new rationale, but also involve the transmission of these values and ideas from generation to generation. The rules of this subculture are learned through association with others, and the subculture promotes value systems where violence is regarded as normal, and is expected in the case of dishonourable conduct. A defendant may, after committing a homicide, as Kornhauser⁸³ and Sutherland⁸⁴ have argued, tend to regard his criminal behaviour in much the same way as religious persons value their traditional and deeply held religious practices. Or, as Wolfgang and Ferracuti⁸⁵ have argued, he may not necessarily champion his behaviour, but may well believe that he has done what was expected, or what he was supposed to do. The defendant experiences normative conflict and he follows the rules of his culture rather than the rules of the dominant culture.

As explained earlier, in communities where honour killings tend to occur, the individual exists only through the community, and it is almost impossible to withdraw from that community. Similarly, many defendants interviewed by the author for the purpose of his doctoral dissertation⁸⁶ said that leaving their community or neighbourhood could have been one way to prevent the murder. They said that the murder could have been prevented if only they had been able to move to another place. This supports Sutherland’s⁸⁷ suggestion that a person commits crime through continuous interaction with people who are in favour of and encourage that violation of law. It also confirms the importance of the association with a group of people having a different and particular cultural understanding of honour and shame.

Conclusion

Up to this point in the discussion, by taking certain characteristics into account, this paper has tried to show that in the communities of the UK where this paper has focused; and where honour killings tend to occur, mutual relationships between males and females including marriage, pre-marital and adulterous sex, are strictly controlled and regulated by institutions and associations in accordance with its cultural norms. It has also tried to show that the sociological structures and characteristics of these communities have provided an environment conducive for the maintenance of these cultural norms and for the occurrence of honour killings. In such communities, as explained earlier, there are superficial social changes rather than deeper cultural changes. These communities can change, but only if the change can be accommodated and internalized with their cultural norms. Therefore, the sociological structure of these communities, rather than Islam or other religious belief, is the main obstacle to internalize new cultural norms and cultural change. It should not be assumed that when people immigrate to the

UK, they only bring their traditional clothes and foods with them; they also bring their own values, traditions and culture. Characteristics of the communities, like endogamy, create an environment conducive to the transmission of the values and ideas from generation to generation. The received cultural norms govern the different understanding of honour and shame which inspires violence, equates loss of honour with loss of life, and sustains subcultures where honour killings tend to occur. The rules of this subculture are learned through association with others, and the subculture promotes a value system where violence is regarded as normal, and is expected of others in the case of dishonourable conduct. The normative principle that the right to claim honour requires killing or violence in return is reinforced and transmitted from generation to generation. These norms are backed up with social rewards and punishment. People who do not wish to follow the norms are criticized, ridiculed, condemned, and those who follow them are admired and respected. If these constraints and sanctions were not in place, the community or subculture would soon lose its separate identity. This to some extent explains why Muslim and non-Muslim communities tend to fail to adopt different ideas, perceptions or understandings of the concept of honour and shame and why their name has become associated with honour killings. It also explains why honour killings still occur in the communities of the UK despite the fact that there are adaptations to wider society.

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NOTES

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3. Olga Craig, "Revealed: Rising Toll of Deaths Before Dishonour". *Sunday, Telegraph* [internet], June 17, 2007. Accessed November 16, 2007. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/06/17/nhonour117.xml>; "Grandmother Who Orchestrated Honour Killing 'Will Die in Prison'". *Times Online* [internet], September 20, 2007. Accessed February 5, 2009. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2492740.ece>
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- Blood, Honour Killings Amongst Turks in the Netherlands*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003; Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, eds., *'Honour' Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence Against Women*, London: Zed Books, 2005; Amir H. Jafri, *Honour Killing, Dilemma, Ritual, Understanding*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008; Jasvinder Sanghera, *Shame*, London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd, 2008; and Rana Husseini, *Murder in the Name of Honour*, Oxford: One World Publications, 2009.
5. Ruth Rosner Kornhauser, *Social Sources of Delinquency*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978; Edwin Hardin Sutherland, *Criminology*, 4th ed., Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1947; Marvin Eugene Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958; and Marvin Eugene Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, *The Subculture of Violence*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981.
 6. According to statistics of Office for National Statistics, in the 2011 Census for England and Wales, the largest religion was Christianity with 33.2 million people (59.3% of the population). Muslims were the next largest religious group with 2.7 million people (4.8% of the population). 14.1 million people in England and Wales said they had no religion, around a quarter (25.1%) of the population. Of the other main religious groups: 817,000 people identified themselves as Hindu (1.5% of population); 423,000 people identified as Sikh (0.8%). Office for National Statistics, "Religion in England and Wales 2011". Accessed March 27, 2012. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_290510.pdf
 7. George B. Vold and T. J. Bernard, *Theoretical Criminology*, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 212, 213.
 8. IPPR (Institute for Public Policy Research), "Britain's Immigrants", *op. cit.*, p. 4.
 9. *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 10.
 10. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
 12. Sulhi Dönmezer, *Sosyoloji Dersleri*, yeniden gözden geçirilmiş genişletilmiş ikinci bası, İstanbul: Sulhi Garan Matbaası Varisleri Koll. Şti, 1968 [Sulhi Dönmezer, *Sociology Lectures*, revised and updated second edition, İstanbul: Sulhi Garan and His Heirs Collective Publishing Partnership, 1968] and Ram Nath Sharma, *Principles of Sociology*, India: Asia Publishing House, 1968.
 13. Sharma, *Principles of Sociology*, *op. cit.*, pp. 43, 179.
 14. Aida Touma-Sliman, "Culture, National Minority and the State: Working Against the 'Crime of Family Honour' Within the Palestinian Community in Israel", in *'Honour' Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence Against Women*, eds. Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, London: Zed Books, 2005, pp. 181–198, p. 193; Jafri, *Honour Killing*, *op. cit.*, p. 85; Husseini, *Murder in the Name of Honour*, *op. cit.*, pp. 14, 132.
 15. Kevorkian, "Reexamining Femicide", *op. cit.*, p. 595.
 16. OCCRI (Oxford Cross-Cultural Research Institute). Accessed November 10, 2007. <http://www.occri.org.uk/Articles/HonourKillings.htm>; Olga Craig, "Revealed: Rising Toll of Deaths Before Dishonour". *Sunday, Telegraph* [internet] *op. cit.*; Conservative Women's Organisation, "Report on the Violence Against Women Summit Held on 11th Oct 2007". Accessed November 16, 2007. http://www.conservativewomen.org.uk/article.asp?art_id=68; Hannana Siddiqui, "There Is No 'Honour' in Domestic Violence, Only Shame! Women's Struggles Against 'Honour' Crimes in the UK", in *'Honour' Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence Against Women*, eds. Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, London: Zed Books, 2005, pp. 263–281, p. 277.
 17. According to the Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, honour killings take place in countries including Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, Iraq, Israel and the occupied territories, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Qatar, Sweden, Syria, Turkey and Yemen (Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (2002), its causes and consequences, E/CN.4/2002/83; Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (2003), its causes and consequences, E/CN.4/2003/75: international, regional and national developments in the area of violence against women). According to Bettiga-Boukerbout honour killing also took place in Italy. Maria Gabriella Bettiga-Boukerbout, "'Crimes of Honour' in the Italian Penal Code: An Analysis of History and Reform", in *'Honour' Crimes*, *op. cit.*, eds. Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, pp. 230–244, p. 235. See also Husseini, *Murder in the Name of Honour*, *op. cit.*
 18. For detailed discussion see Doğan "Is Honour Killing a 'Muslim Phenomenon'", *op. cit.*
 19. Sharma, *Principles of Sociology*, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
 20. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
 21. Dönmezer, *Sosyoloji Dersleri*, *op. cit.*, pp. 90, 91; and Nazand Begikhani, "Honour-based Violence among the Kurds: The Case of Iraqi Kurdistan", in *'Honour' Crimes*, *op. cit.*, eds. Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, pp. 209–229, p. 218.
 22. Dönmezer, *Sosyoloji Dersleri*, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 128 and Sharma, *Principles of Sociology*, *op. cit.*, pp. 53, 54.
24. Sharma, *Principles of Sociology*, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
26. Dönmezer, *Sosyoloji Dersleri*, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
27. Pierre Bourdieu, "The Sentiment of Honour in Kabyle Society", in *Honour and Shame*, *op. cit.*, ed. John George Peristiany, pp. 191–241, p. 220.
28. Dönmezer, *Sosyoloji Dersleri*, *op. cit.* and Sharma, *Principles of Sociology*, *op. cit.*
29. Danielle Hoyek, Rafif Rida Sidawi, and Amira Abou Mrad, "Murders of Women in Lebanon: 'Crimes of Honour' Between Reality and the Law", in *'Honour' Crimes*, *op. cit.*, eds. Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, pp. 111–136, p. 131; CEWLA (Centre for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance), "'Crimes of Honour' as Violence Against Women in Egypt", in *'Honour' Crimes*, *op. cit.*, eds. Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, pp. 137–159, p. 151; Faqir, "Intrafamily Femicide in Defence of Honour", *op. cit.*, p. 70; Hussein, *Murder in the Name of Honour*, *op. cit.*, pp. 150, 153; and Van Eck, *Purified by Blood*, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
30. Faqir, "Intrafamily Femicide in Defence of Honour", *op. cit.*, p. 70.
31. Begikhani, "Honour-based Violence among the Kurds", *op. cit.*
32. Sharma, *Principles of Sociology*, *op. cit.*, p. 275.
33. Cahit Can, *Toplumsal insann evrensel doğası ve cinsel suçlar*, Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2002 [Cahit Can, *The Universal Nature of Human Being as a Social Phenomenon and Sexual Crimes*, Ankara: Seçkin Publishing, 2002]; Faqir, "Intrafamily Femicide in Defence of Honour", *op. cit.*; and Hussein, *Murder in the Name of Honour*, *op. cit.*
34. Cahit Can, *Toplumsal insann evrensel doğası ve cinsel suçlar*, *op. cit.*, pp. 295, 296 and Internet Ancient History Sourcebook. Accessed October 3, 2007. <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/hamcode.html>
35. Nessim Joseph Dawood, *The Koran, The Penguin Classics*, reprinted with minor revisions, London: Clays Ltd, 2003, p. 246.
36. Kevorkian, "Reexamining Femicide", *op. cit.*, p. 595; Aysan Sever and Yurdakul Gokceciçek, "Culture of Honor, Culture of Change", *op. cit.*, p. 986; Abou-Zeid, "Honour and Shame among the Bedouins of Egypt", *op. cit.*, p. 253; Hoyek *et al.*, "Murders of Women in Lebanon", *op. cit.*, p. 131; Jafri, *Honour Killing, Dilemma, Ritual, Understanding*, *op. cit.*, pp. 78, 85; Hussein, *Murder in the Name of Honour*, *op. cit.*, pp. 10, 16, 63; and Van Eck, *Purified by Blood*, *op. cit.*, pp. 57, 189, 191.
37. Sharma, *Principles of Sociology*, *op. cit.*, pp. 388, 389.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 385.
39. John George Peristiany, "The Sophron—A Secular Saint? Wisdom and the Wise in a Cypriot Community", in *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, *op. cit.*, eds. John George Peristiany and Julian A. Pitt-Rivers, pp. 103–127, p. 107; Uma Chakravarti, "From Fathers to Husbands: Of Love, Death and Marriage in North India", in *'Honour' Crimes*, *op. cit.*, eds. Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, pp. 308–331, p. 310; Begikhani, "Honour-based Violence among the Kurds", *op. cit.*, p. 218; Lila Abu-Lughod, *Veiled Sentiments*, *op. cit.*; and Van Eck, *Purified by Blood*, *op. cit.*, pp. 27, 29.
40. Amir Hossein Kordvani, "Hegemonic, Masculinity, Domination, and Violence Against Women". Paper presented at expanding our horizons understanding the complexities of violence against women meanings, cultures, difference, University of Sydney, Australia, February 18–22, 2002. Accessed July 31, 2009. <http://www.austdvclearinghouse.unsw.edu.au/Conference%20papers/Exp-horiz/Kordvani.pdf>; p. 6.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté* [The Elementary Structures of Kinship], Paris: P.U.F., 1949 and Cahit Can, *Toplumsal insann evrensel doğası ve cinsel suçlar*, *op. cit.*
43. Cahit Can, *op. cit.*, p. 167.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 45 and Lévi-Strauss, *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté*, *op. cit.*, 66.
45. According to Begikhani, unlike cross-cousin marriage which is a common marriage form in many communities, parallel-cousin marriage is a common marriage form among the Kurds in Iraq. Traditionally, the Kurds have chosen their future wives from patrilineal kin; the father's brother's daughter (*amoza*) is the preferred choice. Among certain tribes, the first cousin has the obligation and the right to marry his paternal cousin, and if he does not intend to marry her, he has to make his position clear so that she can be given to another man (Nazand Begikhani, "Honour-based Violence among the Kurds", *op. cit.*, pp. 218–219). Similarly, Abu-Lughod states that patrilineal parallel-cousin marriage is a preferred marriage form among the Bedouins of Western Egypt (Abu-Lughod, *Veiled Sentiments*, *op. cit.*). Finally, Delaney states that during her stay and field work lasting two years in a Turkish village

- between 1980 and 1982; with only one exception all marriages were endogamous. Villagers married either kin or other villagers whether they lived in the village, in a town, or the city of Ankara. And patrilineal parallel cousin marriage was a desire reflected by all villagers in order to keep their daughter in the village and group (Carol Delaney, *The Seed and the Soil, Gender and Cosmology in Turkish Village Society*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, pp. 100, 106).
46. John Ernest Goldthorpe, *An Introduction to Sociology*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp. 90, 91.
 47. Kordvani, "Hegemonic, Masculinity, Domination, and Violence Against Women", *op. cit.*, p. 16.
 48. Child marriage, practiced among the higher castes since the Christian era, had become widespread in the nineteenth century in India. It is reported to be a common marriage form among the Hindus where children are married in infancy and allowed to live together when the girl reaches puberty. For further discussion see, Geraldine H. Forbes, "Women and Modernity: The Issue of Child Marriage in India", *Women's Studies International Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1979, pp. 407–419.
 49. Pnina Werbner, "Honor, Shame and the Politics of Sexual Embodiment among South Asian Muslims in Britain and Beyond: An Analysis of Debates in the Public Sphere", *International Social Science Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2005, pp. 25–47, p. 31.
 50. Home Office Forced Marriage Consultation Report. Accessed March 25, 2013. <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/about-us/consultations/forced-marriage/forced-marriageconsultation?view=Binary>
 51. Pnina Werbner, "Honor, Shame and the Politics of Sexual Embodiment", *op. cit.*, p. 30.
 52. Tariq Modood, Sharon Beishon, and Satnam Virdee, *Changing Ethnic Identities*, London: PSI (Policy Studies Institute), 1994, pp. 68–80. Accessed March 28, 2013. http://www.psi.org.uk/index.php/site/publication_detail/608
 53. Werbner, "Honor, Shame and the Politics of Sexual Embodiment", *op. cit.*, p. 30.
 54. A. Bhardwaj, "Growing up Young, Asian and Female in Britain: A Report on Self-harm and Suicide", *Feminist Review*, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2001, pp. 52–67, p. 56 and Sanghera, *Shame, op. cit.*
 55. Kurkiala, "Interpreting Honour Killings", *op. cit.*, p. 7.
 56. Mazhar Bagli and Aysan Sever, "Female and Male Suicides in Batman, Turkey: Poverty, Social Change, Patriarchal Oppression and Gender Links", *The Women's Health & Urban Life: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2003, pp. 60–84; Bhardwaj, "Growing up Young, Asian and Female in Britain", *op. cit.*; Sanghera, *Shame, op. cit.*, pp. 242, 257; and Husseini, *Murder in the Name of Honour, op. cit.*, pp. 125, 175.
 57. Naila Minai, *Women in Islam: Tradition and Transition in the Middle East*, London: Murray, 1981, p. 52.
 58. Goldthorpe, *An Introduction to Sociology, op. cit.*, p. 90.
 59. Kordvani, "Hegemonic, Masculinity, Domination, and Violence Against Women", *op. cit.*, p. 16 (emphasis added).
 60. Kurkiala, "Interpreting Honour Killings", *op. cit.*, p. 7.
 61. Kordvani, "Hegemonic, Masculinity, Domination, and Violence Against Women", *op. cit.*, p. 16.
 62. Begikhani, "Honour-based Violence among the Kurds", *op. cit.*, p. 228.
 63. IPPR (Institute for Public Policy Research), "Britain's Immigrants", *op. cit.*, p. 19. It should be noted that for the same period, the self-employment rate among the economically active working-age population born in the UK was 13%.
 64. Goldthorpe, *An Introduction to Sociology, op. cit.*, pp. 32, 108; Can, *Toplumsal insanın evrensel doğası ve cinsel suçlar, op. cit.*, p. 143; and Sanghera, *Shame, op. cit.*
 65. Vold and Bernard, *Theoretical Criminology, op. cit.*, pp. 212, 213.
 66. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
 67. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
 68. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
 69. Sutherland, *Criminology, op. cit.*, pp. 6, 7.
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 71. Vold and Bernard, *Theoretical Criminology, op. cit.*
 72. Bernard Cohen, "Interneccine Conflict: The Offender", in *Delinquency Selected Studies*, eds. Johan Thorsten Sellin and Marvin E. Wolfgang, London: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969, pp. 112–137, p. 114.
 73. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
 74. Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, pp. 188, 189.
 75. Sutherland, *Criminology, op. cit.*
 76. Wolfgang and Ferracuti, *The Subculture of Violence, op. cit.*

77. There are, however, other commentators like Curtis (1975), who have linked the subculture of violence more closely to the general social conditions that generate it, and have argued that social conditions are in part responsible for producing and maintaining the subculture of violence (Lynn, A. Curtis, *Violence, Race, and Culture*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1975).
78. Begikhani, "Honour-based Violence among the Kurds", *op. cit.*, p. 218 and Abu-Lughod, *Veiled Sentiments*, *op. cit.*
79. Goldthorpe, *An Introduction to Sociology*, *op. cit.*, pp. 90, 91.
80. Kordvani, "Hegemonic, Masculinity, Domination, and Violence Against Women", *op. cit.*, p. 16.
81. *Ibid.* (emphasis added).
82. Begikhani, "Honour-based Violence among the Kurds", *op. cit.*
83. Kornhauser, *Social Sources of Delinquency*, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
84. Sutherland, *Criminology*, *op. cit.*
85. Wolfgang and Ferracuti, *The Subculture of Violence*, *op. cit.*
86. "Honour Killings in Turkey: Culture, Subjectivism, and Provocation". Unpublished PhD diss., Keele University, September 2010.
87. Sutherland, *Criminology*, *op. cit.*